Šiame posėdyje teisėja stebisi, kodėl Neringos Venckienės advokatai nepateikė teismui vadinamojo „teismo įsakymo“ (habeas petition), kai gavo vyriausybės laišką, kuriame sakoma, kad jie gali papildyti savo skundą ir jūs atsiduriate tokioje situacijoje, kad gauna Valstybės departamento nurodymą dar prieš paprašant „teismo įsakymo“
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NERINGA VENCKIENE, ) Docket No. 18 C 03061
)
Petitioner, ) Chicago, Illinois
) June 28, 2018
v. ) 10:04 a.m.
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS – Motion Hearing
BEFORE THE HONORABLE VIRGINIA M. KENDALL
APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioner: MONICO & SPEVACK by
MR. MICHAEL D. MONICO
MR. BARRY A. SPEVACK
20 South Clark Street, Suite 700
Chicago, Illinois 60603
For the Respondent: UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE by
MR. JONATHAN ANDREW CLOW
Assistant United States Attorney
219 South Dearborn Street
5th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Court Reporter: GAYLE A. McGUIGAN, CSR, RMR, CRR
Federal Official Court Reporter
219 South Dearborn, Room 2318-A
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 435-6047
Gayle_McGuigan@ilnd.uscourts.gov
Case: 1:18-cv-03061 Document #: 30 Filed: 07/09/18 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:522
2
(Proceedings heard in open court:)
THE CLERK: 18 C 3061, Venckiene versus United States.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. MONICO: Good morning, your Honor. Michael Monico
and Barry Spevack on behalf of Ms. Venckiene.
THE COURT: She was here, but I think —
MR. MONICO: She was present.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. SPEVACK: Judge, also present is Irene Gintilas.
She’s going to be a translator. Although Ms. Venckiene does
understand English, it’s easier for her —
THE COURT: Sure. No problem.
Please swear in the interpreter, please. Raise your
right hand.
THE CLERK: Raise your right hand.
(Interpreter sworn.)
COURT REPORTER: Spell your last name, please.
INTERPRETER: G-I-N-T-I-L-A-S.
(Defendant enters courtroom.)
THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Venckiene.
MR. CLOW: Your Honor, for the record, Jonathan Clow
on behalf of the United States.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Good morning.
Is everybody on record now? Were you on the record,
Mr. Monico?
MR. MONICO: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, I got you, okay.
All right. So I have all the full briefing and have a
number of questions so that I can make sure we’re doing this
correctly.
And I think it’s really a branching tree of
decision-making when you look at it in the way that it has been
set forth.
So my first question — I guess I’ll ask the
plaintiffs first.
Why did you not file a habeas petition when you
received the letter from the government saying that you can
supplement and you can file, such that then you put yourself in
a situation where you got a department ruling before the habeas
was filed?
MR. SPEVACK: Judge, that decision was made — our
feeling, as we’ve said, is that there’s no requirement that we
challenge the Secretary of State’s ruling first, that the —
there’s no rule that says even when you can file a habeas,
there’s no rule that says you have 14 days or 21 days within
which to file a habeas. We chose to go ahead with the
Secretary of State first, but there was nothing that prevented
us from doing the habeas. Second, we felt like we might get
our relief quicker from the Secretary of State. It didn’t work
out that way.
THE COURT: By supplementing the information, possibly
changing their analysis.
MR. SPEVACK: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. With the understanding that you
thought you would still be able to file the habeas, right?
MR. SPEVACK: Yes.
THE COURT: And is there any case law that says that
you can’t file the habeas request subsequent to the Secretary’s
decision?
MR. SPEVACK: I haven’t seen anything that says you
cannot do it.
There was one case we cited that the government
distinguishes that was that district court case, I think it’s
De La Rosa —
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. SPEVACK: — where it seemed to happen that way,
and I haven’t seen any case where they said it couldn’t be done
that way.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, from your perspective, any
case law that says that that’s inappropriate? Or is it the
statutory scheme that’s set forth?
MR. CLOW: The case law is a gray area, your Honor.
There are no cases that the government is aware of that allows
petitioner to challenge either the certification order or the
magistrate judge or the Secretary of State’s decision post a
surrender warrant being issued.
The only case that they can cite for that proposition
doesn’t even stand for that proposition, as Mr. Spevack noted.
It’s an unpublished, out of circuit, district court decision
that seems to decide without affirmatively ruling on that
issue, a habeas petition after a surrender warrant has been
issued. It’s worth noting that they denied a habeas petition,
but they ruled on it post — post the surrender warrant.
I will say, your Honor, that there are, as it — as it
goes to challenging the decision of the Secretary of State, the
case law is clear that there is no judicial review of the
Secretary of State’s decision.
And that’s one of the main grounds that we have for
saying that there’s no basis for a stay, so I don’t want to go
down the rabbit hole, but I think when — especially when it
comes to —
THE COURT: Well, it’s like — it’s not a rabbit hole.
It’s like this tree where each time you go —
MR. CLOW: Sure.
THE COURT: — down a path, you branch —
MR. CLOW: Don’t want to go down the wrong branch at
this point.
THE COURT: So let me ask you this question then:
What about the due process allegation? I mean, there is case
law that permits that habeas on the due process. It’s very,
very narrow, you know, going to the constitutional issues:
Race, gender, sex, things like that. Can that be done
subsequent to the Secretary’s decision? Or is there
anything —
MR. CLOW: I think —
THE COURT: — in the case law that says it’s improper
to do?
MR. CLOW: So if we’re talking about challenging the
Secretary of State’s decision, I think your Honor is right. I
think there are two very narrow areas where the courts have
identified where petitioners can challenge it, and it’s where
constitutional issues are raised or, if you were in the Ninth
Circuit and raising a Convention Against Torture claim, you
could raise it there as well.
THE COURT: Yes —
MR. CLOW: We’re not in the Ninth Circuit —
THE COURT: — and we’re not doing that, right?
MR. CLOW: We’re not in that —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: No Convention Against Torture claim was
ever raised. We’re not in that realm.
As for the constitutional issues, you’re right, your
Honor, that petitioner did raise the due process claim. As the
government noted in its response, there’s — the case law is
clear that there’s no due process right to have any — to
evaluate the hearing or have a hearing before the Secretary of
State to evaluate the Secretary of State’s decision. There’s
simply just no due process right there.
And I’d also note —
THE COURT: I think their allegation might be rather
that the due process that was violated was not knowing the
reason for the Secretary’s decision, right?
MR. CLOW: And — I think so, your Honor. And there’s
no case law saying that they’re entitled to any sort of
explanation, although I would push back against the
characterization that the Secretary of State didn’t provide any
explanation. And your Honor has the letter. The letter does
state that after considering all the materials, including the
materials considered by Judge Martin and all the materials that
the petitioner submitted during that two-month review process,
that they decided to in their discretion — in the Secretary’s
discretion issue the surrender warrant. So there was no —
it’s not true that there wasn’t any explanation. But, again,
the case law says there’s no explanation at all required.
THE COURT: Okay. So in those narrow circumstances
where a habeas is permitted to challenge the due process
regarding that very narrow set of constitutional issues, you
have the two cases, right? You have the Fourth Circuit case
and I think it’s the Ninth Circuit? Is that correct?
MR. CLOW: That might be right, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me just see. Let me go back.
MR. CLOW: Let me pull it up myself —
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. CLOW: — so I know what we’re referring to.
THE COURT: Here, hang on. The procedural due
process — okay, it’s Fifth Circuit.
Fourth Circuit is the Peroff versus Hylton. And the
Fifth Circuit is Escobedo versus United States. Is that right?
MR. CLOW: I think that’s right, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CLOW: And, again, your Honor is right. If there
was some allegation of the constitutionally impermissible
criteria that weighed into the Secretary of State’s
decision-making, then we would be in a different position. I
haven’t seen any claims even close to that being made by
petitioner. And I — I just don’t think we’re in that realm.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Are you in that realm?
Is that your allegation, that you’ve got a due process
violation that fits into allowing you to go forward with the
habeas?
MR. SPEVACK: Well, we do — we do raise the issue
about whether that there is no explanation with respect to the
Secretary of State.
With respect to the habeas, you know, as counsel says,
he’s found no law that says you can do it; at the same time,
there’s no law that says you cannot do it. There’s no law that
says it is improper to go through the Secretary of State first
and file your habeas —
THE COURT: Well, I think the law is that you can’t
appeal the decision of the Secretary, right?
MR. SPEVACK: Right.
THE COURT: And so then you are looking solely at
whether you can collaterally attack it in some way. And the
only collateral attack that I can see here is this very narrow
ruling on due process.
MR. SPEVACK: But we’re collaterally attacking the
ruling of the district court on the certification —
THE COURT: You mean the magistrate judge.
MR. SPEVACK: The magistrate, yes. I’m sorry, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SPEVACK: I just elevated Judge Martin.
THE COURT: That’s twice today he’s been elevated.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: I’m going to give him a call and make him
feel good about it.
Tell me what your position is on them — what they’re
saying is we’re not challenging the Secretary’s decision; we’re
filing the habeas about Judge Martin’s decision.
MR. CLOW: Well, first, your Honor, I think they are
trying to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision; but I
think we’ve addressed why that’s just not appropriate here and
it can’t be done under the case law.
As to whether they can challenge Magistrate Judge
Martin’s decision at this point, again, your Honor, counsel is
right: There’s no law saying they can’t do it; there’s no law
saying they can.
What we do have is the statutory scheme that says
there’s an initial judicial component to the extra — to an
extradition process. Judge Martin went through that process
and ruled on the very narrow issues before him of whether there
was probable cause, whether a valid treaty existed, and whether
the crimes of which the petitioner was charged fell under that
treaty.
The scheme — the statutory scheme set up by Congress
then gives — has the magistrate judge certify that information
to the Secretary of State, and it’s then within the Secretary
of State’s discretion to decide whether to extradite.
It doesn’t make sense to me in that statutory scheme
that we could — after the Secretary of State goes through this
process of deliberating and weighing the evidence, weighing the
submissions by petitioner, spending two months to use its
discretion to make that decision — that we could then
challenge what it was — what the Secretary of State was
relying on the whole time. It seems to completely undermine
the statutory scheme set up by Congress and by the extradition
treaty between these two countries. It just doesn’t make
sense.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: And I think it’s telling that there are no
cases in this procedural posture. I don’t do these cases for a
living, your Honor. But having spoken with —
THE COURT: But now you had to learn the law, didn’t
you?
MR. CLOW: Now I’ve had to learn it.
But speaking anecdotally with colleagues in D.C. who
oversee these cases, this is a new one for them. This is not a
typical — it’s not a typical procedure.
And I think it’s — you know, I don’t want to
speculate as to the petitioner’s strategy, but I think it
speaks to that they believe that their prime audience under the
law is the Secretary of State, that what they’re claiming is
some sort of political motivation or political bias on behalf
of the requesting country, which is not an issue that was
before Judge Martin and it’s not an issue before your Honor as
well.
THE COURT: Well, and it can’t be an issue before
Judge Martin, right?
MR. CLOW: Correct.
THE COURT: Under the proper standard of review.
MR. CLOW: Correct.
THE COURT: That has to be in the hands of the
Secretary to review — that’s the concept behind the mutual
legal treaties, which is that we are going to work with each
other to protect the sovereignty of each country, provided that
that sovereignty isn’t violating our own constitutional
beliefs, that we would say, and the Secretary will be the one
to say, that we wouldn’t, you know, work on this cooperative
transfer.
So I think you’re coming from a really difficult
position, and I’m just trying to determine exactly what was
presented and what your thoughts are.
Do you have a theory of procedural due process other
than the lack of a reason given by the Secretary for the
extradition such that a habeas would be permissible under the
case law?
MR. SPEVACK: Judge, we believe habeas would be
permissible on the fact of whether this was a political
offense. We think that’s a judicial determination, not a
determination to be made by the Secretary of State. The
Secretary of State has political considerations; but in terms
of a legal determination about whether something is a political
offense, that is something for the courts to decide.
THE COURT: The political offense — well, let me just
go back to that language.
So this is the language from Matter of Burt:
„Generally, so long as the United States has not breached a
specific promise to an accused regarding his or her extradition
and bases its extradition decisions on diplomatic
considerations“ — and here’s your carve-out — „without regard
to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or political beliefs, and in
accordance with such other exceptional constitutional
limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious
procedures or punishments,“ which is what I was just referring
to a moment ago, „employed by the foreign jurisdiction, those
decisions will not be disturbed.“
So it’s your position that a habeas is available to
her based upon an impermissible factor of political beliefs.
MR. SPEVACK: Yes, and whether something is a
political offense under the extradition treaty.
THE COURT: The cases are not very favorable for you
in that area, the ones — the small amount of cases that are
there.
What is your position on that? That they — so their
theory is, you know, we’ve got a due process violation under
that small carve-out — based upon the Secretary’s decision,
though, not Judge Martin’s decision —
MR. SPEVACK: Well, Judge — I’m sorry.
THE COURT: — that the decision was made on political
beliefs.
MR. CLOW: Your Honor, I’m somewhat confused by the
notion that Judge Martin’s decision, the Court’s decision,
about whether the political offense doctrine applies creates
some sort of due process right when it comes to reviewing the
Secretary of State’s decision.
Judge Martin, in fact, did rule on the political
offense doctrine and found that no political offense —
political offense applied. He believed — as I think was the
right decision — was that petitioner for the whole time was
talking about the political motivation of the requesting
country, Lithuania. Those concerns, those arguments are not
before the Court. They’re not before Judge Martin. They’re
not before your Honor. They’re strictly reserved for the
Secretary of State.
THE COURT: So I think — if I can just be rude to
interrupt you for just a moment so I can focus you on where I’m
thinking. I’m excluding petitioner’s argument about Judge
Martin’s opinion, and I think you’re correct on that under the
law.
What I’m wondering is if — we understand that the
Secretary’s extradition determination is generally not subject
to judicial review; however, we have this exception carved out
that the executive’s conduct is subject to some constitutional
constraint, and that’s defined in that Burt case law, if he
can’t then file a habeas regarding his position here that it’s
political beliefs, under that.
MR. CLOW: So if I understand Mr. Spevack correctly,
they’re honing in on that political beliefs language from Burt.
And I’m not aware — I haven’t seen any evidence or, frankly,
heard any argument from petitioner about the Secretary of
State’s bias or political beliefs of petitioner playing into
the Secretary of State’s decision.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CLOW: I think the arguments —
THE COURT: I agree.
MR. CLOW: — are all about the political motivation
of Lithuania.
THE COURT: I agree. I think that it’s — but it also
wasn’t developed under the briefing that I requested because I
requested the jurisdictional briefing is what I’m thinking.
I don’t know if they can develop it. I don’t know if
you can develop that —
MR. SPEVACK: We can address it, Judge.
THE COURT: I don’t know if it’s possible.
But let me ask you this. So if — let’s just assume
there were a habeas potential under this very narrow issue —
which I’ve said is a steep, steep hill for you to climb under
the case law — does that stay her removal under that
exception? Under the — like under the Burt case?
MR. CLOW: I’m not sure I follow, your Honor. I
THE COURT: Does it stay the Secretary’s decision?
Because the stay is a whole — another body of case law. But
if a habeas —
MR. CLOW: Sure.
THE COURT: — hits that narrow constitutional
exception as defined in Burt, and they have — and they claim
they have the ability to make that argument, then does that
stay the decision?
MR. CLOW: If your Honor — if — to make sure I’m
tracking correctly —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CLOW: — if you make a decision ruling in their
favor on the habeas petition, then —
THE COURT: Just filing it is the question. Just
filing —
MR. CLOW: Just filing? No, no, your Honor.
THE COURT: Not ruling in their favor.
MR. CLOW: No. I apologize, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, just filing —
MR. CLOW: To be clear, the government’s position
has — and I’ve communicated this with petitioner — has been
and continues to be that unless a stay is currently being
litigated or is in place from your Honor, that the surrender
warrant stands and the Secretary of State can extradite the
petitioner.
So, really, I mean, to put it bluntly, what’s keeping
petitioner here at this point is the fact that the stay is
being litigated.
THE COURT: Uh-hum. Understood.
So even if the Court, in your opinion, would grant the
petitioner the opportunity to file a habeas petition addressing
the narrow due process right that is set forth in the Burt
case — which I agree with you, they have not developed on the
papers — but if that were filed, that still doesn’t in your
opinion provide a stay.
I’m not sure about that. I’m not sure that’s right.
MR. CLOW: I don’t — I don’t know that I’ve discussed
that particular issue with my colleagues.
THE COURT: I know.
MR. CLOW: But I will say that it’s — in my
discussions, our position has been — again, as we’ve
communicated to petitioner — that just the filing of a habeas
alone at this point, now that the Secretary of State has made
their decision, is not going to stay —
THE COURT: Is not going to do it.
MR. CLOW: — any proceedings.
Had they done it before? Yes, the Secretary of State
would have ceased their deliberations. But since we’re in this
strange posture, just the filing of a petition or a brief alone
is not enough.
MR. SPEVACK: But the repercussions of not continuing
the stay at this point are just — you know, would basically
moot the entire case and —
THE COURT: So — and I wish that I had the same kind
of discretionary feelings that you have that I could exercise.
But when I read the case law, it’s not a situation where I —
if I go through the factors, I have to go through the stay
factors, right? And it has to be a situation that already the
Secretary has looked at and taken into account. And I can’t
replace my interpretation of the law with the Secretary’s
interpretation. I can only look at my jurisdictional avenue
that I see is just the constitutionality of that decision in
that very narrow area.
MR. SPEVACK: And I think, Judge, you know, I disagree
to the extent that I think you can review whether this is a
political offense. I think that is still before the Court.
THE COURT: Uh-hum.
MR. SPEVACK: You know, I mean, I can develop that
argument, but I believe that is still before the Court.
MR. MONICO: Something happened last week as well,
Judge. A member of Congress from — we sent a copy of this,
your Honor, but —
THE COURT: I’ve been getting supplements regarding,
you know, the political climate and things that are occurring,
yes, I have been, from you —
MR. MONICO: Yes.
THE COURT: — you know, the supplements.
MR. MONICO: I mean, a member of Congress has
introduced a bill in Congress to prevent Ms. Venckiene from
being extradited and allowing her, this event, to be continued
until her asylum is heard.
MR. SPEVACK: We filed that motion and set it up for
Monday, Judge. We sent you courtesy copies of it.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SPEVACK: It was — the bill was just introduced,
I think, on — like two days ago —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SPEVACK: We just got it.
MR. MONICO: By Congressman Smith from New Jersey who
is a member of the House Committee on the U.N. and the civil
rights issues.
THE COURT: Right.
Mr. Clow, I don’t want to put you on the spot. I
don’t know if you have the answer.
Was your answer to me that you weren’t certain whether
the habeas petition in the narrow due process angle stays? And
you wanted to check? Or did you think, no, it doesn’t stay it?
MR. CLOW: My understanding, based on my colleagues,
is that it won’t stay it. I think a stay needs to be in the
process of being litigated or in effect — or entered.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I needed all of this
information in order to rule, and I’m not going to rule from
the bench right now because I have to now apply it to the case
law that I have.
So apparently you’re still stayed until I make my
ruling about whether or not you need to do something else.
I will say, again, that the only avenue that I can see
from my case law review is this very narrow aspect of
constitutionality that I would have jurisdiction over based
upon Congress’s directives, and that is the Burt case, if I go
there.
And then according to what Mr. Clow is telling you, it
wouldn’t even matter. Even if I were to say you can file the
habeas petition and support it and brief it, he’s — his
position right now is that they would still remove her.
MR. SPEVACK: Can I address that, Judge?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. SPEVACK: And, Judge, also — and we would ask the
Court to — our motion is up on Monday with respect to this
supplement, and the Court could take a look at the bill that
was introduced by — in the House of Representatives, which is
Give Judge Venckiene Her Day in Court Act, and it would — it
would be a bill that would stay all these actions until her
asylum is ruled on. So that is also going to be in front of
the Court as of Monday, or if you give us permission to file
today, we won’t appear on Monday.
THE COURT: So — oh, you can file the supplement. I
don’t have any problem —
MR. SPEVACK: Yeah. That’s what we did.
THE COURT: — with filing the supplement. And,
Mr. Clow, you certainly can supplement with something if you
feel appropriate.
MR. CLOW: Certainly.
THE COURT: I mean, I have no problem with getting —
more information is always helpful. It doesn’t bother me at
all.
MR. SPEVACK: Well, then I would direct the Court to
the bill that is — because that would basically I think stay
everything if that bill is passed.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. SPEVACK: So that has now just been introduced I
think on the 25th of June.
THE COURT: Right. And all of this goes to equitable
considerations that, if we look at the statutory structure, is
not really in my hands right now, which I think is the thing
that has to — has to be recognized directly.
And as I’ve said now I think three times, the only
thing that I think might be in my hands is this habeas on this
area that I mentioned. And then I will take a look at the case
law subsequent to our discussion today to see if that in any
way has impact on the Secretary’s decision as far as enacting
it.
MR. CLOW: Your Honor, if I could address a couple
things.
THE COURT: Please.
MR. CLOW: Just for your consideration, given that at
the end of the day this is petitioner’s burden to show that for
the stay —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: — to show that there’s a strong likelihood
of success on the merits. When it comes to the narrow grounds
that we’ve discussed here, the due process issue, that there is
some sort of impermissible consideration of Ms. Venckiene’s
political beliefs in the Secretary of State’s decision, I would
just note for your Honor’s consideration that this briefing has
been — this case has been pending for about four months now,
that we’ve had the Secretary of State’s decision for two months
now.
THE COURT: Not with me, though.
MR. CLOW: Not with you.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: But the petitioner has had the Secretary of
State’s decision for two months now. They’ve had continued
briefing on this issue. I’ve seen no evidence, no argument to
that effect that the Secretary of State was himself biased in
making this —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: — decision or used any constitutionally
impermissible basis —
THE COURT: Well, as I mentioned already, Mr. Clow,
the case law is not very good for you on that regard, but
that’s the only narrow carve-out that I’ve seen so far.
MR. CLOW: Just for your Honor’s consideration —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CLOW: — that at this time, we — there’s no
argument for that. And considering whether there’s —
whether — you know, counsel says that he can work that up and
put that into a brief, but we haven’t seen that yet in
considering whether there’s a likelihood that they can show a
strong showing on the merits, likely success on the merits.
I would only say as to the bill — counsel notified me
of the bill that was apparently introduced by Representative
Smith from New Jersey earlier this week.
I would only say, putting it in terms of the stay
factors, it’s on them to show a strong likelihood of success on
the merits.
I’ve seen no indications or no press, I have no
information about the likelihood of that bill going anywhere.
THE COURT: Well, I would never try to get into
determining what Congress is going to do —
MR. CLOW: No, and I —
THE COURT: — and how they’re going to do it. We
don’t know how sausage is made, right?
MR. CLOW: Certainly.
So I just point that out, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So let me just — on the motion to
stay issues, of course you have to show a likelihood of success
on the merits, and that the — you know, this was a political
offense exception to the treaty.
And as Mr. Clow has stated, there’s just a number of
cases that have really talked about what’s a violent
disturbance versus what is a rebellion and a revolution, and
those cases are not strongly in your favor at all, and so —
MR. SPEVACK: Judge —
THE COURT: Before I go on —
MR. SPEVACK: Judge, I’m sorry.
THE COURT: I’m just giving you not a ruling, but a
preview of analysis.
MR. SPEVACK: I appreciate that.
THE COURT: And then also that the finding of probable
cause is such a limited review that Judge Martin had, and he
did that review, which is simply determining whether the law
exists and whether there was a charge, et cetera, whether it
was one that was part of the country that’s requesting her
return, and that probable cause factor also isn’t in your
favor, very helpful in your favor.
So then the next questions are just, as you know, the
harm and the public interest.
And so we — that’s where we stand, and that’s where
we stand with this small exception.
MR. SPEVACK: I think that last one is where we are
the strongest —
THE COURT: I understand, yeah. So —
MR. MONICO: Judge —
THE COURT: I’ll let you say whatever you need for my
review.
I had to review all of the law in order to ask these
final questions to summarize and get you a ruling, but I will
take on your supplemental filings.
And then what else do you want to say today?
MR. MONICO: Judge Venckiene has asked if she could
speak to your Honor.
THE COURT: I have no problem with that. In English
or — then go to the microphone for me, please.
THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Your Honor, I
would not take any of your time in other case, but because I —
I am afraid for my status of what might happen if you extradite
me, I would like to put a few words.
I’m not going to go into the depth of the — of my
case, but I want to touch upon certain habeas issues and also
in the view of the cases that I got myself acquainted with in
the process.
The government representative states that there were
cases, multiple cases — multiple hearings in front of Judge
Martin, but it’s not the case.
THE COURT: It’s my understanding that there was one
hearing, and it was about two hours long. That was my reading
of the record.
THE DEFENDANT: It’s true.
THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) I was arrested
on the 13th of February, and my hearing was just a week later.
There are court rulings stating that habeas corpus has
to be heard if there was not — if there was not insufficient
time given to get ready with the trial, with the case.
There were also cases where there was — the issue was
mentioned that I was not given an opportunity to provide
testimony.
If the solicitors did not file habeas corpus on time,
that shouldn’t be taken as my fault.
There are also cases where it was said that habeas
corpus has to be examined because of these violations. I also
have a list of cases and decisions supporting my plea for
having habeas corpus heard.
THE COURT: Do you want to list them for me now? You
may. Mr. Clow, are you writing them down, too, so you have
them?
MR. CLOW: Yes, your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Examples of
speech. The party was not given adequate time to prepare —
MR. MONICO: Do you want the name of the case, Judge?
THE COURT: All I want is the name of the case, not
her summary —
MR. MONICO: We can send them to you.
THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Williams versus
Maggeo (phonetic).
MR. MONICO: We’ll be happy to send them to you.
We’ll send them all.
THE COURT: All right. So, of course, to Mr. Clow as
well.
MR. MONICO: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Okay. I’ll take a look at the cases that you’re
reciting.
INTERPRETER: Five of them.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Thank you.
THE COURT: We’ll take a look at those as well.
MR. MONICO: Can I say one thing, Judge?
This woman’s life is at stake.
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. MONICO: And it’s — you know, her family is here.
Her only son is here. Her friends are here. I — you know,
you can tell, she’s been in jail now for over four months.
She’s never been arrested for anything. She has no — she
should — if anybody in America should not be in jail, it’s
this woman.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. MONICO: I’m just —
THE COURT: I understand your position, and I
understand your concerns.
I am not God. I am a federal district court judge,
and I have to act within the boundaries of my authority and my
jurisdiction. And that is all that I’m looking at right now is
to determine what ability, if any, I have, and I’m going to do
it under the law, so that’s where we will go.
Mr. Clow, to the extent that I have asked whether
there is any stay that goes with the habeas filed under the
narrow exception I’ve set forth, if you find any other cases in
your post-argument discussion, I would appreciate you also
supplement the record regarding that.
MR. CLOW: Certainly, your Honor.
THE COURT: And then you can, of course, send it to
the other side. All right?
So what I will do is I will rule on what I have before
me and determine whether or not a habeas can be filed and
whether that impacts the stay based upon your answers and my
discussion with you.
And in order for this not to slip between the cracks,
I’ll set this over for two weeks until July 12th, okay?
And you may get a ruling before then. All right?
Thank you very much.
MR. SPEVACK: I’m sorry, Judge. When would you like a
submission —
THE COURT: Oh, at — so let’s put it at
10:00 o’clock.
Am I on trial?
THE CLERK: You are not.
THE COURT: Okay. At 10:00 o’clock.
MR. SPEVACK: And what about — we want to
supplement —
THE COURT: You’re permitted to supplement.
MR. SPEVACK: A particular time that you want it or
just —
THE COURT: Well, I’m going to be working on this
immediately based — so as soon as you can.
MR. SPEVACK: As soon as we can.
THE COURT: Okay?
MR. SPEVACK: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks very much.
MR. CLOW: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. MONICO: Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Take care.
(Proceedings concluded at 10:37 a.m.)
C E R T I F I C A T E
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the
record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
/s/ GAYLE A. McGUIGAN_____________ July 2, 2018
Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR Date
Official Court Reporter
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