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Šiame posėdyje teisėja stebisi, kodėl Neringos Venckienės advokatai nepateikė teismui vadinamojo „teismo įsakymo“ (habeas petition), kai gavo vyriausybės laišką, kuriame sakoma, kad jie gali papildyti savo skundą ir jūs atsiduriate tokioje situacijoje, kad gauna Valstybės departamento nurodymą dar prieš paprašant „teismo įsakymo“








NERINGA VENCKIENE, ) Docket No. 18 C 03061 

Petitioner, ) Chicago, Illinois 

) June 28, 2018 

v. ) 10:04 a.m. 


Respondent. ) 




For the Petitioner: MONICO & SPEVACK by 



20 South Clark Street, Suite 700 

Chicago, Illinois 60603 



Assistant United States Attorney 

219 South Dearborn Street 

5th Floor 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Court Reporter: GAYLE A. McGUIGAN, CSR, RMR, CRR 

Federal Official Court Reporter 

219 South Dearborn, Room 2318-A 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

(312) 435-6047 

Case: 1:18-cv-03061 Document #: 30 Filed: 07/09/18 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:522

(Proceedings heard in open court:) 

THE CLERK: 18 C 3061, Venckiene versus United States. 

THE COURT: Good morning. 

MR. MONICO: Good morning, your Honor. Michael Monico 

and Barry Spevack on behalf of Ms. Venckiene. 

THE COURT: She was here, but I think — 

MR. MONICO: She was present. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

MR. SPEVACK: Judge, also present is Irene Gintilas. 

She’s going to be a translator. Although Ms. Venckiene does 

understand English, it’s easier for her — 

THE COURT: Sure. No problem. 

Please swear in the interpreter, please. Raise your 

right hand. 

THE CLERK: Raise your right hand. 

(Interpreter sworn.) 

COURT REPORTER: Spell your last name, please. 


(Defendant enters courtroom.) 

THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Venckiene. 

MR. CLOW: Your Honor, for the record, Jonathan Clow 

on behalf of the United States. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Good morning. 

Is everybody on record now? Were you on the record, 

Mr. Monico? 


MR. MONICO: Yes, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay, I got you, okay. 

All right. So I have all the full briefing and have a 

number of questions so that I can make sure we’re doing this 


And I think it’s really a branching tree of 

decision-making when you look at it in the way that it has been 

set forth.

So my first question — I guess I’ll ask the 

plaintiffs first. 

Why did you not file a habeas petition when you 

received the letter from the government saying that you can 

supplement and you can file, such that then you put yourself in 

a situation where you got a department ruling before the habeas 

was filed?

MR. SPEVACK: Judge, that decision was made — our 

feeling, as we’ve said, is that there’s no requirement that we 

challenge the Secretary of State’s ruling first, that the — 

there’s no rule that says even when you can file a habeas, 

there’s no rule that says you have 14 days or 21 days within 

which to file a habeas. We chose to go ahead with the 

Secretary of State first, but there was nothing that prevented 

us from doing the habeas. Second, we felt like we might get 

our relief quicker from the Secretary of State. It didn’t work 

out that way. 

THE COURT: By supplementing the information, possibly 

changing their analysis. 


THE COURT: Okay. With the understanding that you 

thought you would still be able to file the habeas, right? 


THE COURT: And is there any case law that says that 

you can’t file the habeas request subsequent to the Secretary’s 


MR. SPEVACK: I haven’t seen anything that says you 

cannot do it. 

There was one case we cited that the government 

distinguishes that was that district court case, I think it’s 

De La Rosa — 


MR. SPEVACK: — where it seemed to happen that way, 

and I haven’t seen any case where they said it couldn’t be done 

that way.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, from your perspective, any 

case law that says that that’s inappropriate? Or is it the 

statutory scheme that’s set forth? 

MR. CLOW: The case law is a gray area, your Honor. 

There are no cases that the government is aware of that allows 

petitioner to challenge either the certification order or the 

magistrate judge or the Secretary of State’s decision post a 

surrender warrant being issued. 

The only case that they can cite for that proposition 

doesn’t even stand for that proposition, as Mr. Spevack noted. 

It’s an unpublished, out of circuit, district court decision 

that seems to decide without affirmatively ruling on that 

issue, a habeas petition after a surrender warrant has been 

issued. It’s worth noting that they denied a habeas petition, 

but they ruled on it post — post the surrender warrant. 

I will say, your Honor, that there are, as it — as it 

goes to challenging the decision of the Secretary of State, the 

case law is clear that there is no judicial review of the 

Secretary of State’s decision. 

And that’s one of the main grounds that we have for 

saying that there’s no basis for a stay, so I don’t want to go 

down the rabbit hole, but I think when — especially when it 

comes to — 

THE COURT: Well, it’s like — it’s not a rabbit hole. 

It’s like this tree where each time you go — 

MR. CLOW: Sure. 

THE COURT: — down a path, you branch — 

MR. CLOW: Don’t want to go down the wrong branch at 

this point. 

THE COURT: So let me ask you this question then: 

What about the due process allegation? I mean, there is case 

law that permits that habeas on the due process. It’s very, 

very narrow, you know, going to the constitutional issues: 

Race, gender, sex, things like that. Can that be done 

subsequent to the Secretary’s decision? Or is there 

anything — 

MR. CLOW: I think — 

THE COURT: — in the case law that says it’s improper 

to do? 

MR. CLOW: So if we’re talking about challenging the 

Secretary of State’s decision, I think your Honor is right. I 

think there are two very narrow areas where the courts have 

identified where petitioners can challenge it, and it’s where 

constitutional issues are raised or, if you were in the Ninth 

Circuit and raising a Convention Against Torture claim, you 

could raise it there as well. 


MR. CLOW: We’re not in the Ninth Circuit — 

THE COURT: — and we’re not doing that, right? 

MR. CLOW: We’re not in that — 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: No Convention Against Torture claim was 

ever raised. We’re not in that realm. 

As for the constitutional issues, you’re right, your 

Honor, that petitioner did raise the due process claim. As the 

government noted in its response, there’s — the case law is 

clear that there’s no due process right to have any — to 

evaluate the hearing or have a hearing before the Secretary of 

State to evaluate the Secretary of State’s decision. There’s 

simply just no due process right there. 

And I’d also note — 

THE COURT: I think their allegation might be rather 

that the due process that was violated was not knowing the 

reason for the Secretary’s decision, right? 

MR. CLOW: And — I think so, your Honor. And there’s 

no case law saying that they’re entitled to any sort of 

explanation, although I would push back against the 

characterization that the Secretary of State didn’t provide any 

explanation. And your Honor has the letter. The letter does 

state that after considering all the materials, including the 

materials considered by Judge Martin and all the materials that 

the petitioner submitted during that two-month review process, 

that they decided to in their discretion — in the Secretary’s 

discretion issue the surrender warrant. So there was no — 

it’s not true that there wasn’t any explanation. But, again, 

the case law says there’s no explanation at all required. 

THE COURT: Okay. So in those narrow circumstances 

where a habeas is permitted to challenge the due process 

regarding that very narrow set of constitutional issues, you 

have the two cases, right? You have the Fourth Circuit case 

and I think it’s the Ninth Circuit? Is that correct? 

MR. CLOW: That might be right, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Let me just see. Let me go back. 

MR. CLOW: Let me pull it up myself — 


MR. CLOW: — so I know what we’re referring to. 

THE COURT: Here, hang on. The procedural due 

process — okay, it’s Fifth Circuit. 

Fourth Circuit is the Peroff versus Hylton. And the 

Fifth Circuit is Escobedo versus United States. Is that right? 

MR. CLOW: I think that’s right, your Honor. 


MR. CLOW: And, again, your Honor is right. If there 

was some allegation of the constitutionally impermissible 

criteria that weighed into the Secretary of State’s 

decision-making, then we would be in a different position. I 

haven’t seen any claims even close to that being made by 

petitioner. And I — I just don’t think we’re in that realm. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Are you in that realm? 

Is that your allegation, that you’ve got a due process 

violation that fits into allowing you to go forward with the 


MR. SPEVACK: Well, we do — we do raise the issue 

about whether that there is no explanation with respect to the 

Secretary of State. 

With respect to the habeas, you know, as counsel says, 

he’s found no law that says you can do it; at the same time, 


there’s no law that says you cannot do it. There’s no law that 

says it is improper to go through the Secretary of State first 

and file your habeas — 

THE COURT: Well, I think the law is that you can’t 

appeal the decision of the Secretary, right? 

MR. SPEVACK: Right. 

THE COURT: And so then you are looking solely at 

whether you can collaterally attack it in some way. And the 

only collateral attack that I can see here is this very narrow 

ruling on due process. 

MR. SPEVACK: But we’re collaterally attacking the 

ruling of the district court on the certification — 

THE COURT: You mean the magistrate judge. 

MR. SPEVACK: The magistrate, yes. I’m sorry, Judge. 


MR. SPEVACK: I just elevated Judge Martin. 

THE COURT: That’s twice today he’s been elevated. 


THE COURT: I’m going to give him a call and make him 

feel good about it. 

Tell me what your position is on them — what they’re 

saying is we’re not challenging the Secretary’s decision; we’re 

filing the habeas about Judge Martin’s decision. 

MR. CLOW: Well, first, your Honor, I think they are 

trying to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision; but I 


think we’ve addressed why that’s just not appropriate here and 

it can’t be done under the case law. 

As to whether they can challenge Magistrate Judge 

Martin’s decision at this point, again, your Honor, counsel is 

right: There’s no law saying they can’t do it; there’s no law 

saying they can. 

What we do have is the statutory scheme that says 

there’s an initial judicial component to the extra — to an 

extradition process. Judge Martin went through that process 

and ruled on the very narrow issues before him of whether there 

was probable cause, whether a valid treaty existed, and whether 

the crimes of which the petitioner was charged fell under that 


The scheme — the statutory scheme set up by Congress 

then gives — has the magistrate judge certify that information 

to the Secretary of State, and it’s then within the Secretary 

of State’s discretion to decide whether to extradite. 

It doesn’t make sense to me in that statutory scheme 

that we could — after the Secretary of State goes through this 

process of deliberating and weighing the evidence, weighing the 

submissions by petitioner, spending two months to use its 

discretion to make that decision — that we could then 

challenge what it was — what the Secretary of State was 

relying on the whole time. It seems to completely undermine 

the statutory scheme set up by Congress and by the extradition 

treaty between these two countries. It just doesn’t make 


THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: And I think it’s telling that there are no 

cases in this procedural posture. I don’t do these cases for a 

living, your Honor. But having spoken with — 

THE COURT: But now you had to learn the law, didn’t 


MR. CLOW: Now I’ve had to learn it. 

But speaking anecdotally with colleagues in D.C. who 

oversee these cases, this is a new one for them. This is not a 

typical — it’s not a typical procedure. 

And I think it’s — you know, I don’t want to 

speculate as to the petitioner’s strategy, but I think it 

speaks to that they believe that their prime audience under the 

law is the Secretary of State, that what they’re claiming is 

some sort of political motivation or political bias on behalf 

of the requesting country, which is not an issue that was 

before Judge Martin and it’s not an issue before your Honor as 


THE COURT: Well, and it can’t be an issue before 

Judge Martin, right? 

MR. CLOW: Correct. 

THE COURT: Under the proper standard of review. 

MR. CLOW: Correct. 

THE COURT: That has to be in the hands of the 

Secretary to review — that’s the concept behind the mutual 

legal treaties, which is that we are going to work with each 

other to protect the sovereignty of each country, provided that 

that sovereignty isn’t violating our own constitutional 

beliefs, that we would say, and the Secretary will be the one 

to say, that we wouldn’t, you know, work on this cooperative 


So I think you’re coming from a really difficult 

position, and I’m just trying to determine exactly what was 

presented and what your thoughts are. 

Do you have a theory of procedural due process other 

than the lack of a reason given by the Secretary for the 

extradition such that a habeas would be permissible under the 

case law?

MR. SPEVACK: Judge, we believe habeas would be 

permissible on the fact of whether this was a political 

offense. We think that’s a judicial determination, not a 

determination to be made by the Secretary of State. The 

Secretary of State has political considerations; but in terms 

of a legal determination about whether something is a political 

offense, that is something for the courts to decide. 

THE COURT: The political offense — well, let me just 

go back to that language. 

So this is the language from Matter of Burt: 

„Generally, so long as the United States has not breached a 

specific promise to an accused regarding his or her extradition 

and bases its extradition decisions on diplomatic 

considerations“ — and here’s your carve-out — „without regard 

to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, 

sex, national origin, religion, or political beliefs, and in 

accordance with such other exceptional constitutional 

limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious 

procedures or punishments,“ which is what I was just referring 

to a moment ago, „employed by the foreign jurisdiction, those 

decisions will not be disturbed.“ 

So it’s your position that a habeas is available to 

her based upon an impermissible factor of political beliefs. 

MR. SPEVACK: Yes, and whether something is a 

political offense under the extradition treaty. 

THE COURT: The cases are not very favorable for you 

in that area, the ones — the small amount of cases that are 


What is your position on that? That they — so their 

theory is, you know, we’ve got a due process violation under 

that small carve-out — based upon the Secretary’s decision, 

though, not Judge Martin’s decision — 

MR. SPEVACK: Well, Judge — I’m sorry. 

THE COURT: — that the decision was made on political 



MR. CLOW: Your Honor, I’m somewhat confused by the 

notion that Judge Martin’s decision, the Court’s decision, 

about whether the political offense doctrine applies creates 

some sort of due process right when it comes to reviewing the 

Secretary of State’s decision. 

Judge Martin, in fact, did rule on the political 

offense doctrine and found that no political offense — 

political offense applied. He believed — as I think was the 

right decision — was that petitioner for the whole time was 

talking about the political motivation of the requesting 

country, Lithuania. Those concerns, those arguments are not 

before the Court. They’re not before Judge Martin. They’re 

not before your Honor. They’re strictly reserved for the 

Secretary of State. 

THE COURT: So I think — if I can just be rude to 

interrupt you for just a moment so I can focus you on where I’m 

thinking. I’m excluding petitioner’s argument about Judge 

Martin’s opinion, and I think you’re correct on that under the 


What I’m wondering is if — we understand that the 

Secretary’s extradition determination is generally not subject 

to judicial review; however, we have this exception carved out 

that the executive’s conduct is subject to some constitutional 

constraint, and that’s defined in that Burt case law, if he 

can’t then file a habeas regarding his position here that it’s 

political beliefs, under that. 

MR. CLOW: So if I understand Mr. Spevack correctly, 

they’re honing in on that political beliefs language from Burt. 

And I’m not aware — I haven’t seen any evidence or, frankly, 

heard any argument from petitioner about the Secretary of 

State’s bias or political beliefs of petitioner playing into 

the Secretary of State’s decision. 


MR. CLOW: I think the arguments — 

THE COURT: I agree. 

MR. CLOW: — are all about the political motivation 

of Lithuania. 

THE COURT: I agree. I think that it’s — but it also 

wasn’t developed under the briefing that I requested because I 

requested the jurisdictional briefing is what I’m thinking. 

I don’t know if they can develop it. I don’t know if 

you can develop that — 

MR. SPEVACK: We can address it, Judge. 

THE COURT: I don’t know if it’s possible. 

But let me ask you this. So if — let’s just assume 

there were a habeas potential under this very narrow issue — 

which I’ve said is a steep, steep hill for you to climb under 

the case law — does that stay her removal under that 

exception? Under the — like under the Burt case? 

MR. CLOW: I’m not sure I follow, your Honor. I 

THE COURT: Does it stay the Secretary’s decision? 

Because the stay is a whole — another body of case law. But 

if a habeas — 

MR. CLOW: Sure. 

THE COURT: — hits that narrow constitutional 

exception as defined in Burt, and they have — and they claim 

they have the ability to make that argument, then does that 

stay the decision? 

MR. CLOW: If your Honor — if — to make sure I’m 

tracking correctly — 


MR. CLOW: — if you make a decision ruling in their 

favor on the habeas petition, then — 

THE COURT: Just filing it is the question. Just 

filing —

MR. CLOW: Just filing? No, no, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Not ruling in their favor. 

MR. CLOW: No. I apologize, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Yes, just filing — 

MR. CLOW: To be clear, the government’s position 

has — and I’ve communicated this with petitioner — has been 

and continues to be that unless a stay is currently being 

litigated or is in place from your Honor, that the surrender 

warrant stands and the Secretary of State can extradite the 


So, really, I mean, to put it bluntly, what’s keeping 

petitioner here at this point is the fact that the stay is 

being litigated. 

THE COURT: Uh-hum. Understood. 

So even if the Court, in your opinion, would grant the 

petitioner the opportunity to file a habeas petition addressing 

the narrow due process right that is set forth in the Burt 

case — which I agree with you, they have not developed on the 

papers — but if that were filed, that still doesn’t in your 

opinion provide a stay. 

I’m not sure about that. I’m not sure that’s right. 

MR. CLOW: I don’t — I don’t know that I’ve discussed 

that particular issue with my colleagues. 

THE COURT: I know. 

MR. CLOW: But I will say that it’s — in my 

discussions, our position has been — again, as we’ve 

communicated to petitioner — that just the filing of a habeas 

alone at this point, now that the Secretary of State has made 

their decision, is not going to stay — 

THE COURT: Is not going to do it. 

MR. CLOW: — any proceedings. 

Had they done it before? Yes, the Secretary of State 

would have ceased their deliberations. But since we’re in this 

strange posture, just the filing of a petition or a brief alone 

is not enough. 

MR. SPEVACK: But the repercussions of not continuing 

the stay at this point are just — you know, would basically 

moot the entire case and — 

THE COURT: So — and I wish that I had the same kind 

of discretionary feelings that you have that I could exercise. 

But when I read the case law, it’s not a situation where I — 

if I go through the factors, I have to go through the stay 

factors, right? And it has to be a situation that already the 

Secretary has looked at and taken into account. And I can’t 

replace my interpretation of the law with the Secretary’s 

interpretation. I can only look at my jurisdictional avenue 

that I see is just the constitutionality of that decision in 

that very narrow area. 

MR. SPEVACK: And I think, Judge, you know, I disagree 

to the extent that I think you can review whether this is a 

political offense. I think that is still before the Court. 

THE COURT: Uh-hum. 

MR. SPEVACK: You know, I mean, I can develop that 

argument, but I believe that is still before the Court. 

MR. MONICO: Something happened last week as well, 

Judge. A member of Congress from — we sent a copy of this, 

your Honor, but — 

THE COURT: I’ve been getting supplements regarding, 

you know, the political climate and things that are occurring, 

yes, I have been, from you — 


THE COURT: — you know, the supplements. 

MR. MONICO: I mean, a member of Congress has 

introduced a bill in Congress to prevent Ms. Venckiene from 

being extradited and allowing her, this event, to be continued 

until her asylum is heard. 

MR. SPEVACK: We filed that motion and set it up for 

Monday, Judge. We sent you courtesy copies of it. 


MR. SPEVACK: It was — the bill was just introduced, 

I think, on — like two days ago — 


MR. SPEVACK: We just got it. 

MR. MONICO: By Congressman Smith from New Jersey who 

is a member of the House Committee on the U.N. and the civil 

rights issues. 

THE COURT: Right. 

Mr. Clow, I don’t want to put you on the spot. I 

don’t know if you have the answer. 

Was your answer to me that you weren’t certain whether 

the habeas petition in the narrow due process angle stays? And 

you wanted to check? Or did you think, no, it doesn’t stay it? 

MR. CLOW: My understanding, based on my colleagues, 

is that it won’t stay it. I think a stay needs to be in the 

process of being litigated or in effect — or entered. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I needed all of this 

information in order to rule, and I’m not going to rule from 

the bench right now because I have to now apply it to the case 

law that I have. 

So apparently you’re still stayed until I make my 

ruling about whether or not you need to do something else. 

I will say, again, that the only avenue that I can see 

from my case law review is this very narrow aspect of 

constitutionality that I would have jurisdiction over based 

upon Congress’s directives, and that is the Burt case, if I go 


And then according to what Mr. Clow is telling you, it 

wouldn’t even matter. Even if I were to say you can file the 

habeas petition and support it and brief it, he’s — his 

position right now is that they would still remove her. 

MR. SPEVACK: Can I address that, Judge? 


MR. SPEVACK: And, Judge, also — and we would ask the 

Court to — our motion is up on Monday with respect to this 

supplement, and the Court could take a look at the bill that 

was introduced by — in the House of Representatives, which is 

Give Judge Venckiene Her Day in Court Act, and it would — it 

would be a bill that would stay all these actions until her 

asylum is ruled on. So that is also going to be in front of 

the Court as of Monday, or if you give us permission to file 

today, we won’t appear on Monday. 

THE COURT: So — oh, you can file the supplement. I 

don’t have any problem — 

MR. SPEVACK: Yeah. That’s what we did. 

THE COURT: — with filing the supplement. And, 

Mr. Clow, you certainly can supplement with something if you 

feel appropriate. 

MR. CLOW: Certainly. 

THE COURT: I mean, I have no problem with getting — 

more information is always helpful. It doesn’t bother me at 


MR. SPEVACK: Well, then I would direct the Court to 

the bill that is — because that would basically I think stay 

everything if that bill is passed. 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. SPEVACK: So that has now just been introduced I 

think on the 25th of June. 

THE COURT: Right. And all of this goes to equitable 

considerations that, if we look at the statutory structure, is 

not really in my hands right now, which I think is the thing 

that has to — has to be recognized directly. 

And as I’ve said now I think three times, the only 

thing that I think might be in my hands is this habeas on this 

area that I mentioned. And then I will take a look at the case 

law subsequent to our discussion today to see if that in any 

way has impact on the Secretary’s decision as far as enacting 


MR. CLOW: Your Honor, if I could address a couple 


THE COURT: Please. 

MR. CLOW: Just for your consideration, given that at 

the end of the day this is petitioner’s burden to show that for 

the stay — 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: — to show that there’s a strong likelihood 

of success on the merits. When it comes to the narrow grounds 

that we’ve discussed here, the due process issue, that there is 

some sort of impermissible consideration of Ms. Venckiene’s 

political beliefs in the Secretary of State’s decision, I would 

just note for your Honor’s consideration that this briefing has 

been — this case has been pending for about four months now, 

that we’ve had the Secretary of State’s decision for two months 


THE COURT: Not with me, though. 

MR. CLOW: Not with you. 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: But the petitioner has had the Secretary of 

State’s decision for two months now. They’ve had continued 

briefing on this issue. I’ve seen no evidence, no argument to 

that effect that the Secretary of State was himself biased in 

making this — 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: — decision or used any constitutionally 

impermissible basis — 

THE COURT: Well, as I mentioned already, Mr. Clow, 

the case law is not very good for you on that regard, but 

that’s the only narrow carve-out that I’ve seen so far. 

MR. CLOW: Just for your Honor’s consideration — 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. CLOW: — that at this time, we — there’s no 

argument for that. And considering whether there’s — 

whether — you know, counsel says that he can work that up and 

put that into a brief, but we haven’t seen that yet in 

considering whether there’s a likelihood that they can show a 

strong showing on the merits, likely success on the merits. 

I would only say as to the bill — counsel notified me 

of the bill that was apparently introduced by Representative 

Smith from New Jersey earlier this week. 

I would only say, putting it in terms of the stay 

factors, it’s on them to show a strong likelihood of success on 

the merits. 

I’ve seen no indications or no press, I have no 

information about the likelihood of that bill going anywhere. 

THE COURT: Well, I would never try to get into 

determining what Congress is going to do — 

MR. CLOW: No, and I — 

THE COURT: — and how they’re going to do it. We 

don’t know how sausage is made, right? 

MR. CLOW: Certainly. 

So I just point that out, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay. So let me just — on the motion to 

stay issues, of course you have to show a likelihood of success 

on the merits, and that the — you know, this was a political 

offense exception to the treaty. 

And as Mr. Clow has stated, there’s just a number of 

cases that have really talked about what’s a violent 

disturbance versus what is a rebellion and a revolution, and 

those cases are not strongly in your favor at all, and so — 

MR. SPEVACK: Judge — 

THE COURT: Before I go on — 

MR. SPEVACK: Judge, I’m sorry. 

THE COURT: I’m just giving you not a ruling, but a 

preview of analysis. 

MR. SPEVACK: I appreciate that. 

THE COURT: And then also that the finding of probable 

cause is such a limited review that Judge Martin had, and he 

did that review, which is simply determining whether the law 

exists and whether there was a charge, et cetera, whether it 

was one that was part of the country that’s requesting her 

return, and that probable cause factor also isn’t in your 

favor, very helpful in your favor. 

So then the next questions are just, as you know, the 

harm and the public interest. 

And so we — that’s where we stand, and that’s where 

we stand with this small exception. 

MR. SPEVACK: I think that last one is where we are 

the strongest — 

THE COURT: I understand, yeah. So — 

MR. MONICO: Judge — 

THE COURT: I’ll let you say whatever you need for my 


I had to review all of the law in order to ask these 

final questions to summarize and get you a ruling, but I will 

take on your supplemental filings. 

And then what else do you want to say today? 

MR. MONICO: Judge Venckiene has asked if she could 

speak to your Honor. 

THE COURT: I have no problem with that. In English 

or — then go to the microphone for me, please. 

THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Your Honor, I 

would not take any of your time in other case, but because I — 

I am afraid for my status of what might happen if you extradite 

me, I would like to put a few words. 

I’m not going to go into the depth of the — of my 

case, but I want to touch upon certain habeas issues and also 

in the view of the cases that I got myself acquainted with in 

the process. 

The government representative states that there were 

cases, multiple cases — multiple hearings in front of Judge 

Martin, but it’s not the case. 

THE COURT: It’s my understanding that there was one 

hearing, and it was about two hours long. That was my reading 

of the record. 

THE DEFENDANT: It’s true. 

THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) I was arrested 

on the 13th of February, and my hearing was just a week later. 

There are court rulings stating that habeas corpus has 

to be heard if there was not — if there was not insufficient 

time given to get ready with the trial, with the case. 

There were also cases where there was — the issue was 

mentioned that I was not given an opportunity to provide 


If the solicitors did not file habeas corpus on time, 

that shouldn’t be taken as my fault. 

There are also cases where it was said that habeas 

corpus has to be examined because of these violations. I also 

have a list of cases and decisions supporting my plea for 

having habeas corpus heard. 

THE COURT: Do you want to list them for me now? You 

may. Mr. Clow, are you writing them down, too, so you have 


MR. CLOW: Yes, your Honor. 

THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Examples of 

speech. The party was not given adequate time to prepare — 

MR. MONICO: Do you want the name of the case, Judge? 

THE COURT: All I want is the name of the case, not 

her summary — 

MR. MONICO: We can send them to you. 

THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Williams versus 

Maggeo (phonetic). 

MR. MONICO: We’ll be happy to send them to you. 

We’ll send them all. 

THE COURT: All right. So, of course, to Mr. Clow as 



THE COURT: Thank you. 

Okay. I’ll take a look at the cases that you’re 


INTERPRETER: Five of them. 

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 

THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Thank you. 

THE COURT: We’ll take a look at those as well. 

MR. MONICO: Can I say one thing, Judge? 

This woman’s life is at stake. 

THE COURT: I understand. 

MR. MONICO: And it’s — you know, her family is here. 

Her only son is here. Her friends are here. I — you know, 

you can tell, she’s been in jail now for over four months. 

She’s never been arrested for anything. She has no — she 

should — if anybody in America should not be in jail, it’s 

this woman. 

THE COURT: Right. 

MR. MONICO: I’m just — 

THE COURT: I understand your position, and I 

understand your concerns. 

I am not God. I am a federal district court judge, 

and I have to act within the boundaries of my authority and my 

jurisdiction. And that is all that I’m looking at right now is 

to determine what ability, if any, I have, and I’m going to do 

it under the law, so that’s where we will go. 

Mr. Clow, to the extent that I have asked whether 

there is any stay that goes with the habeas filed under the 

narrow exception I’ve set forth, if you find any other cases in 

your post-argument discussion, I would appreciate you also 

supplement the record regarding that. 

MR. CLOW: Certainly, your Honor. 

THE COURT: And then you can, of course, send it to 

the other side. All right? 

So what I will do is I will rule on what I have before 

me and determine whether or not a habeas can be filed and 

whether that impacts the stay based upon your answers and my 

discussion with you. 

And in order for this not to slip between the cracks, 

I’ll set this over for two weeks until July 12th, okay? 

And you may get a ruling before then. All right? 

Thank you very much. 

MR. SPEVACK: I’m sorry, Judge. When would you like a 

submission — 

THE COURT: Oh, at — so let’s put it at 

10:00 o’clock. 

Am I on trial? 

THE CLERK: You are not. 

THE COURT: Okay. At 10:00 o’clock. 

MR. SPEVACK: And what about — we want to 

supplement — 

THE COURT: You’re permitted to supplement. 

MR. SPEVACK: A particular time that you want it or 

just — 

THE COURT: Well, I’m going to be working on this 

immediately based — so as soon as you can. 

MR. SPEVACK: As soon as we can. 


MR. SPEVACK: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks very much. 

MR. CLOW: Thank you, Judge. 

THE COURT: Thank you. 

MR. MONICO: Thank you. 

THE COURT: All right. Take care. 

(Proceedings concluded at 10:37 a.m.) 

C E R T I F I C A T E 

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the 

record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 

/s/ GAYLE A. McGUIGAN_____________ July 2, 2018 

Gayle A. McGuigan, CSR, RMR, CRR Date 

Official Court Reporter 

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